Human Systems Integration Division @ NASA Ames

Space projects rely completely on people for development and implementation – but project risk lists rarely include human factors as significant sources of risk. Investigations of recent space mission failures, most notably the Columbia disaster, have pointed to human issues and “cultural factors” as underlying causes. Reports have focused on behaviors and artifacts of organizational culture, which are most visible to the investigators; they have not usually identified the basic assumptions that are the essence of culture and the drivers of behavior.

An earlier paper identified and explained certain cultural and behavioral human factors related to mission success in both NASA and military space programs; it reviewed studies of both NASA and military missions, including investigations of the Mars ’98 failures. It briefly described four main behavioral factors related to mission success, some risks related to such factors, and how such risks might be mitigated.

This paper takes the next step in the analysis, and integrates the work of organization development practitioners and experts who focus on the cultural imperatives that guide behavior in organizations. I reviewed psychological literature related to human anxiety and its relief, and interviewed a practicing psychologist who leads the Employee Assistance Program at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory. I will perhaps raise more questions than I answer concerning the power of specific cultural imperatives; but I will suggest some effective means of changing the basic assumptions that drive “cultural” behaviors.